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INTRODUCTION
A new industry grew out of the AIDS crisis of the 1980s: the secondary trade
in life insurance policies.' Victims of HIV and AIDS faced certain death-half
within the first year after diagnosis, and eighty-five percent within three years.'
Meanwhile, AIDS rendered its victims both physically debilitated' and socially
untouchable,4 often cutting them off from employment' and employer-
provided health insurance.6 Treatment, though largely ineffective,7 cost the av-
erage patient up to s8o,ooo.' Those infected-at first, predominantly gay
men9-were often abandoned by their families,"o and government programs
provided little support."
1. Francis Flaherty, Death Benefits Become Living Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993,
§ i (Magazine), at 37 (discussing viatical settlement as a mechanism to finance
medical treatment and other living expenses).
2. MIRKo D. GRMEK, HISTORY OF AIDS: EMERGENCE AND ORIGIN OF A MODERN
PANDEMIC 94 (Russell C. Maulitz & Jacalyn Duffin trans., Princeton Univ. Press
1990) (1989).
3. JONATHAN ENGEL, THE EPIDEMIc: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF AIDS 30 (20o6)
("[E]nd-stage AIDS entailed a wholesale dissolution of the patient's immune sys-
tem .... ").
4. TAMSIN WILTON, ANTIBODY POLITIC: AIDS AND SOCIETY 20 (1992) ("(P]eople
living with HIV and with AIDS have become social outcasts in a way which is re-
miniscent of the treatment meted out to people with leprosy or bubonic plague in
the Middle Ages.... (Tlhey and their families and associates have been subject to
neglect, ostracism, abuse and even violence.").
5. Edward H. Yelin et al., The Impact of HIV-Related Illness on Employment, 81 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 79, 79 (1991).
6, Nancy E. Kass et al., Loss of Private Health Insurance Among Homosexual Men with
AIDS, 28 INQUIRY 249, 249-253 (1991).
7. GRMEK, supra note 2, at 183-87.
8. David E. Bloom & Geoffrey Carliner, The Economic Impact ofAIDS in the United
States, 239 SCIENCE 604, 605-o6 (1988); see also SUSAN HUNTER, AIDS IN AMERICA
179-80 (2oo6) (discussing a patient's $35,000-per-year treatment costs); Fred J.
Hellinger, Forecasting the Medical Care Costs of the HIV Epidemic: 1991-1994. 28
INQUIRY 213, 217 (1991) (estimating costs for non-AIDS HIV patients at $5,150 per
year and for AIDS sufferers at $32,000 per year). See generally Lee Ann Dean,
Note, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Viatical Settlement, and the Health
Care Crisis: AIDS Patients Reach into the Future To Make Ends Meet, 25 RUTGERS
L.J. 117, 122-27 (1993) (discussing increases in AIDS treatment costs).
9. B. Frank Polk, The Epidemiology of the HTLV-Ill Virus (April 3, 1986), in AIDS
AND EMPLOYMENT: FACTS AND MYTHs, A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF A SEMINAR HELD AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
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In desperate need, AIDS sufferers accepted offers from investors to buy
their tragically valuable life insurance policies." Sellers received cash on which
to subsist; buyers gained an investment with a virtually certain, near-term
payout. These transactions were called viatical settlements-named for the Via-
ticum, the Eucharist given in the Roman Catholic Church as last rites to the dy-
ing."
The viatical settlements market crashed in the mid-199os when protease in-
hibitors suddenly and radically extended life expectancies of persons with AIDS,
substantially delaying payouts for investors.14 The industry shifted its focus to
other groups of terminally ill policyholders" and, ultimately, to elderly insureds.
Unlike diseases vulnerable to dramatic advances in medical technology, old age
provides investors with a relatively stable and predictable basis on which to
make purchase decisions." Today, viatical settlements represent a small portion
of the secondary market in life insurance policies, the bulk of which consists of
"life settlements" with elderly policyholders. 7
ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, 1986, at 18, 27 (discussing findings that
73% of the first 15,000 reported infections afflicted gay or bisexual men).
10. See Kay B. Tiblier et al., Therapeutic Issues When Working with Families of Persons
with AIDS, in AIDS AND FAMILIES 81 (Eleanor D. Macklin ed., 1989) (discussing
the impact of factors such as ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic class on ac-
ceptance and rejection of AIDS victims by family members).
11. JAMES MONROE SMITH, AIDS AND SOCIETY 151-52 (1996).
12. Flaherty, supra note 1, at 37.
13. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 589 (2d ed. 1989); see also Siporin v. Carrington, 23
P. 3d 92, 93 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) ("The term 'viatical' comes from the Latin
word 'viaticum' which is the Eucharist or communion given to Christians who are
dying or are in danger of death; to the Romans, it meant money or provisions for
a journey, but the term came to refer to last rites-something to sustain the de-
ceased person on his or her 'last journey."' (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1988 (3d ed. 1996))).
14. David W. Dunlap, AIDS Drugs Alter an Industry's Math; Recalculating Death-
Benefit Deals, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1996, at Di (discussing how protease inhibitors
reduced viatical settlement profitability and forced providers to seek customer
groups suffering from illnesses other than AIDS); see also Frank J. Palella et al.,
Declining Morbidity and Mortality Among Patients with Advanced Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED, 853 (1998) (attributing de-
creased morbidity of AIDS patients to anti-retroviral medications).
15. Dunlap, supra note 14, at Di.
16. Ellen Kelleher, Cash in on the American Way of Death, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/13bo9204-78b3-ndc-aaf2-oooo779fdac.html.
17. Recent Innovations in Securitization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Mrkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., lth Cong.
46 n.4 (2009) [hereinafter Securitization Hearings] (statement of J. Russel Dorsett,
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To date, each settlement has generally stood as an investment unto itself,
but Wall Street has shown new interest in the prospect of securitizing life set-
tlementsa-that is, pooling large numbers of policies and issuing multiple levels
or tranches of bonds backed by the pool. Wall Street's interest, however, comes
in the wake of the mortgage securitization crisis and the Great Recession, 9 na-
turally raising concerns that life settlement securitization could lead to similar
problems.2 o
According to the financial scholarship, the causes of the mortgage securiti-
zation crisis were a number of risk-expanding "frictions"-mostly information
asymmetries and interest misalignments." As a result of these frictions, no mar-
ket participant had sufficient information and incentive to minimize risk. Bor-
rowers did not fully understand complex mortgage agreements and had strong
incentives to access quick cash through borrowing. Many also erroneously as-
sumed that rising home values would enable them to refinance. Banks had in-
centives to lend to non-credit-worthy borrowers because loans could be sold to
securitization arrangers, shielding lenders from any risk of default. Likewise, ar-
rangers were able to pass risk on to investors through bond sales. Investors-or
more typically, investment managers-relied on the bonds' attractive credit rat-
ings, which were based on the strong historical performance of mortgages and
failed to account adequately for correlation risk (the risk that many defaults
would occur at once)." When property values did fall, refinancing became diffi-
cult, and defaults became prevalent. Investors suffered tremendous losses, the
market for resale of loans evaporated, and lending stopped."
President, Life Insurance Settlement Association); Rebecca Knight, A Safer Way of
Dicing with Death, FIN. TIMEs (London), Mar. 5, 2005, at m24.
18. Matt Brady, The Presence of Institutional Investors Grows, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH INS. NEWS (Nov. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/ssues/2007/42/Life%2oSettlement%2
oSupplement/Pages/The-Presence-Of-Institutional-Investors-Grows.aspx.
19. For an overview of the start of the Great Recession and its effects on Wall Street,
see CouNcIL OF Ecow. ADVISERS, ANNUAL REPORT 41-44 (2010), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/erp/issue/1694/download/17625/ERP-AR
CEA_2001.pdf.
20. For simplicity, I use "life settlement securitization" to include both viatical and
life settlements.
21, Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization ofSubprime
Mortgage Credit (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-43, 20o8), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=107u89. I adopt Ashcraft and Schuermann's ter-
minology because I build on their analysis, but the term "friction" may incorrectly
suggest that these sources of risk increase tension and conflict. They might be bet-
ter characterized as "over-lubrication" because they encourage execution of risky
transactions.
22. Id. (manuscript at ii).
23. See COUNCIL Or EcoN. ADVISERS, supra note 19, at 41-44.
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Law provided no significant ex ante incentives for market participants to
exercise care in securitizations. Courts have largely interpreted current law as
leaving losses with investors,24 and the Securities Exchange Comission's (SEC)
only major suit brought in response to the crisis addressed the special case of
the allegedly intentional creation of faulty investments by Goldman Sachs?5 As
such, Congress began deliberating how to overhaul U.S. financial regulations to
prevent similar crises in the future.2
In September 2009, a New York Times article described how Wall Street se-
curitizers were turning their attention away from the ashes of the mortgage
market and towards life settlements. The article warned against hasty invest-
ment in a market that could prove as disaster-prone as that for mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) . 7 When Congress held hearings on the issue three
weeks later, representatives of the life settlement industry roundly dismissed
fears that securitization in their market could lead to trouble.' The industry's
claims were backed by arguments that death rates, unlike default rates, do not
fluctuate significantly with economic cycles.'9 Congress has since remained si-
24. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531
F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing a securities fraud claim because alleged finan-
cial mismanagement lacked scienter).
25. Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 1o-CV- 3 22 9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,
200).
26. See discussion infra Part Ill.
27. Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2oo9, at Ai.
28. See Securitization Hearings, supra note 17 (statement of Brian D. Pardo, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer, Life Partners Holdings, Inc.); see also id. (statement
of Daniel Curry, President, DBRS, Inc.); id. (statement of J. Russel Dorsett, Presi-
dent, Life Insurance Settlement Association); id. (statement of Jack Kelly, Director
of Government Affairs, Institutional Life Markets Association); id. (statement of
Steven H. Strongin, Managing Director, Global Investment Research, Goldman,
Sachs & Co.).
29. See Patrick D. Dolan, Securitization of Life Settlements, Structured Settlements and
Lottery Awards, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 2008, at 957, 961 (PLI
Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 14108, 2008) (noting
that the life settlement-backed security "has attracted attention because it is a
'non-correlative' asset"); Matthew Goldstein, Profiting from Mortality: Death
Bonds May Be the Most Macabre Investment Scheme Ever Devised by Wall Street,
Bus. WK. (July 30, 2007), available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/
content/o7.Ji/b40440o1.htm (describing life settlements as "uncorrelated assets").
Death rates do correlate to economic growth, but negatively; a deep recession
would increase death rates and, if anything, speed life settlement payouts. Harvey
Brenner, Commentary: Economic Growth Is the Basis of Mortality Rate Decline in
the 20th Century-Experience of the United States 1901-2000, 34 INT'L J. EPIDEMI-
OLOGY 1214 (2005).
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lent on the issue, and the industry has continued its development in the absence
of regulation.
This Note takes up the question Congress began to ask: could viatical and
life settlement securitization create substantial risks to investors and the econ-
omy?3" Is new regulation necessary to prevent future problems? I conclude that
life settlement securitization does exhibit, sometimes in nuanced forms, many
of the weaknesses and risks seen in mortgage securitization. I argue that under
the wrong conditions, a securitized life settlement market could collapse in the
same fashion as the market for mortgage-backed securities. Furthermore, pre-
venting such a collapse calls for tailored regulation.
Steven Strongin, Goldman Sachs's Head of Global Investment Research, ar-
gued in congressional testimony that "life settlement securitizations do not ap-
pear to pose any special securitization related risk and can be treated like any
other securitization." He is wrong. But so far, Congress has followed Stron-
gin's advice and largely ignored non-loan types of securitization, such as life set-
tlement collateralization. As Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, Sena-
tor Chris Dodd claimed that recently enacted financial reform "doesn't just
look through the rear-view mirror to address the failures that caused the eco-
nomic crisis. It looks through the windshield" to prevent the next set of prob-
lems." However, a close reading of the new law shows that its language does not
address many of the risks in life settlement securitization. The securitization de-
bate in legal scholarship has scrutinized the causes of the late crisis,33 ruminated
on other markets that could fall prey to securitization's weaknesses,34 and dis-
cussed ways to reform.5 However, like Congress, legal academia has overlooked
30. Some readers may question why society should allow securitization in this market
or even countenance the secondary market at all. However, the virtues of viatical
and life settlements-providing value to the sick and elderly who may have few
other assets-are significant, and securitization generally serves to increase societ-
al wealth and clarify investment risk. See Neil Doherty & Hal Singer, The Benefits
of a Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. ). 449
(2003); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 133 (1994).
31. Securitization Hearings, supra note 17, at 96 (statement of Steven H. Strongin,
Managing Director, Gloval Investment Research, Goldman, Sachs & Co.).
32. Chris Dodd, We Won't Get Caught off Guard Next Time, HARTFORD COURANT,
April 25, 2010, http://articles.courant.com/2010-o4-25/news/hc-dodd-truth-about-
finance-ref.artapr25jwall-street-firms-bill-curbs.
33. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Sub-
prime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REv. 373 (2008).
34. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZo L. REv. 1553 (2008).
35. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A Prudent Legal
Structure and a Fanciful Critique, 30 CARDOzo L. REV. 617 (2008); Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Future ofSecuritization, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1313 (2009).
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life settlement collateralization and the potential effects of new financial regula-
tion on non-loan types of securitization.
It should be noted that while a life settlement securitization crisis could be
structurally similar to the mortgage crisis, the life settlement market is projected
to reach s16o billion in face value by 203036-a modest size compared to the
$19.1 trillion in life insurance in force at the end of 2008,7 or the $14.4 trillion in
outstanding mortgage debt at the close of 20o9. * Nevertheless, even a relatively
minor life settlement crisis could cost billions of dollars. A less likely worst-case
scenario in the life settlement market could rival the magnitude of major histor-
ic economic crises. For example, the Savings and Loan Crisis led to direct costs
of $146 billion, spread over the 198os and 199os.39 More recently, the Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis centered on asset devaluations that cost investors $8o to sioo bil-
lion in the second half of 1997.40
The primary concern in a life settlement meltdown would be that an initial
loss of value in the ballpark of those that caused these historic crises--even if
smaller after accounting for inflation and economic expansion-would give rise
36. SUNEET KAMATH & TIMOTHY SLEDGE, SANFORD C. BERNSTEIN & Co., LIFE IN-
SURANCE LONG VIEW-LIFE SETTLEMENTS NEED NOT BE UNSETTLING 8 (2005),
available at http://www.coventry.com/pdfs/Bernstein.pdf. A similar number is
cited in Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2007).
37. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2009, at 66 tbl.7 .1
(2009), available at http://www.acli.com/NR/rdonlyresoBFEABCA-lE2A-4F4C-
A879-95CFl04238AB/22615/2oogLifelnsurersFactBooki.pdf.
38. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys.
(Dec. 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/
mortoutstand20091231.htm.
39. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, 13 F.D.I.C. BANKING REV. 26, 31 tbl.4 (2000). For a discussion of
how overly generous commercial lending brought about this crisis, see JAMES R.
BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LoAN DEBACLE (1991).
40. M. Faizul Islam, The Asian Five: From Financial Crisis to Economic Recovery, in
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 123, 123 (). Jay Choi ed., 2000). In that crisis, "{floreign
borrowing led to a domestic lending boom across all of Asia, which generated
multiple asset bubbles, especially in stock markets and real estate. . . . There was
simply too much foreign money chasing too few sound investments... ." Karl D.
Jackson, Introduction: The Roots of the Crisis, in ASIAN CONTAGION: THE CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF A FINANCIAL CRISIS 1, 5 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1999). Asset
bubbles burst when foreign investors pulled funds out of Asia, causing major ex-
change rate changes, which were initially perceived as the source of the crisis. Id.
at 3. For deeper analysis of the sources of the Asian crisis, see Giancarlo Corsetti et
al., The Asian Crisis: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence and Policy Debate, in
THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONTAGION, AND CONSEQUENCES 127, 141
(Pierre-Richard Ag6nor et al. eds., 1999), which finds that the Asian crisis's tur-
moil correlated to weaknesses in the Asian economy such as the prevalence of
non-performing loans.
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to a market panic, perhaps greatly out of proportion to actual flaws in market
fundamentals. 4 1 Whether an economic crisis develops depends on how the rele-
vant assets are concentrated in the economy and how clearly the market under-
stands the relevant risks.4 For example, in the mortgage crisis, institutions that
had little exposure to bad assets nonetheless suffered an exodus of investment
dollars because "investors could not penetrate the portfolios far enough" to de-
termine the true level of risk.43 It is more than conceivable that, as in the mort-
gage crisis, major financial institutions would be among the investors most hurt
by a collapse of life settlement securitization. Moreover, if a crisis freezes this
market, mark-to-market rules-which require balance sheets to reflect the
present value of financial assets-could force investment houses to treat settle-
ment-backed securities as worthless and report them immediately as losses." As
financial institutions increase their reserves to safeguard against such losses,
they necessarily lend less to others, causing further contraction in the financial
sector.45
Troubles like those seen at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers could raise
concerns about counter-party risk-fears that loans to troubled institutions
would ultimately go unpaid-and hence a freezing up of credit markets.4 ' As
with MBS, the complexity and lack of clarity surrounding life settlement securi-
tization could easily cloud other actors' understanding of the true risks and
spread panic in the financial sector. So, while the life settlement market will not
rival the systemic threat to the economy posed by the mortgage collapse, it still
has the potential to cause a significant crisis in the U.S. and global economies.
Such a meltdown is worth preventing. This Note seeks to show how.
Analysis here proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on the
viatical and life settlement industry and recent movements towards securitiza-
tion. Part II makes an original contribution to scholarship in this area by in-
specting life settlement securitization for the risk-expanding frictions that oth-
ers have identified as roots of the mortgage securitization crisis. Part II also
identifies three frictions unique to life settlement securitization and suggests
how these frictions, especially in combination, might lead to market disorder.
Part III reviews current regulatory proposals for securitization and calls for ad-
41. See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No.
08-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1255362.
42. Id.
43. Id. (manuscript at 59).
44. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157: Fair Value Measurements,
FIN. ACCT. SERIES, Sept. 2oo6.
45. See Ben S. Bernanke, Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propaga-
tion of the Great Depression, 73 Am. EcoN. REv. 257 (1983).
46. See Frederic S. Mishkin, Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical
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ditional regulations to resolve the unique and subtle frictions of life settlement
securitization.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS MARKET
This Part describes (A) the emergence of the settlements market; (B) the
rise of stranger-oriented life insurance as a means of circumventing insurable
interest laws; (C) regulation of the evolving industry; (D) recent market trends
and movements toward securitization of life settlements; and (E) the reaction to
the settlement securitization that has begun to occur.
A. Emergence of the Settlements Market
The secondary market for life insurance-the market into which insureds
can sell their own policies-has existed in some form for over a century. As ear-
ly as 1855, New York's Court of Appeals recognized the right of an insured to sell
his policy to a third party.47 The U.S. Supreme Court followed in 1911 with
Grigsby v. Russell, finding in favor of secondary policy sales as a matter of pre-
Erie federal common law and declaring, "The law has no universal cynic fear of
the temptation opened by a pecuniary benefit accruing upon a death."48
Few policyholders, however, exercised their right to sell, and no robust sec-
ondary market developed.49 Instead, throughout most of the twentieth century,
insureds typically surrendered their policies back to their insurers for a fraction
of face value when they could no longer afford their premiums or no longer
needed insurance. As the only practical and interested purchasers, insurance
firms enjoyed significant monopsony power in repurchasing the policies they
had issued. Surrender prices remained low until the advent of viatical settle-
ments."o
In 1988, amidst the perfect storm of the AIDS crisis, viatical settlement pro-
viders began buying HIV patients' life insurance policies," examining policy-
holders' medical records, setting prices based on life expectancies, and paying
47. St. John v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 N.Y. 31, 39 (1855) ("It seems to me it cannot
be doubted, but that the assured might legally assign the policies to the plain-
tiff.").
48. 222 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1911) (holding valid a life insurance policy sale to a third party
lacking an insurable interest).
49. See Doherty & Singer, supra note 30, at 451 n.5.
50. Id. at 450; see also Neil A. Doherty et al., The Secondary Market for Life Insurance
Policies: Uncovering Life Insurance's "Hidden" Value, 6 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR
95, 101-03 (2005) ("In its early stages, this market consisted of only the issuing life
insurance carrier and a handful of individual speculators at the margins.").
51. Flaherty, supra note i, at 37.
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premiums for the duration of settled policies." Payouts to policyholders, or
"viators," ranged from below 50% of face value for those expected to live up to
twenty-four months, to 80% for those expected to die within six months."
Insurers stood to lose from the advent of viatical settlements. Without a
secondary market, more insureds would have failed to pay premiums, allowing
term policies to lapse or surrendering universal or whole life policies for a small
payout. 4 An insurer's financial planning depends on accurately forecasting
these lapse rates: since an insurer does not pay death benefits on a lapsed policy,
the insurer can charge lower premiums, making its policies more competitive in
the primary market. Reduced lapse rates mean increased costs for insurance
providers and hence, higher premiums for insureds."
In response to competition from viatical settlements, many insurers insti-
tuted "accelerated death benefits" in the 199os-in essence, higher surrender
values for insureds with reduced life expectancies. 6 In this competition,
though, insurers enjoyed the advantage of legitimacy. The viatical industry had
struggled from its inception to establish a respectable image in spite of its inhe-
rently morbid trade-and its entanglement with fraud and crime.
At different times, fraud has infected every stage of the viatication and life
settlement process. Viators have hidden illnesses from insurers (sometimes with
accomplices to stand in at physical examinations),57 and healthy policyholders
have conspired with physicians to fake serious illnesses, inflating settlement
proceeds.'" New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer sued a settlement provider
52. Id.
53. Joseph B. Treaster, Death Benefits, Now for the Living, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998,
§ 3, at 1.
54. See Doherty & Singer, supra note 30, at 450-51.
55. See Terry M. Magady, Practice Tips: Selling Life Insurance on the Secondary Market,
28 L.A. LAW, 14 (2006). Empirically, the lapse rate for all U.S. life insurance poli-
cies fell from 8.9% in 1988 to 5.8% in 1998, though this drop may reflect causes oth-
er than viatical and life settlement proliferation. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., LIFE
INSURANCE FACT BooK 11 (1999); see also Laurence Mauer & Neil Holden, Deter-
minants of the Lapse Rate in Life Insurance Operating Companies, 28 REV. Busi-
NESS 54 (2007).
56. Doherty & Singer, supra note 30, at 466-67. Like a monopsonist, "a monopolist
loses its price-setting ability with the entry of competition." Id. (citing WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, EcoNoMics: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 272 (6th ed.
1994)).
57. Retirement Protection: Fighting Fraud in the Sale of Death: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 1o7th Cong.
2-3 (2002) (statement of Lee Covington, Director, Ohio Department of Insur-
ance).
58. Knight, supra note 17.
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for allegedly paying brokers to ignore other providers' bids59 (the suit ultimately
settled out of court).6 o Others have defrauded investors by exaggerating ex-
pected profits or embezzling entrusted funds" Additional cases demonstrate
the potential for murder. For example, two septegenarian women in California
befriended two homeless men, bought life insurance on them, and then killed
them. The women collected $2.8 million in death benefits before being con-
victed for murder and sentenced to life in prison.62 Meanwhile, federal authori-
ties sought forfeiture of $4 million in benefits paid upon the death of a Florida
man whose policy was purchased by a Colombian drug cartel as part of a mon-
ey-laundering scheme." While murder has not been alleged in this case, the
dangers in such situations are clear.
B. Stranger-Oriented Life Insurance
Perhaps the most important fraud for the insurance settlement industry
comes in the form of "stranger-oriented life insurance" or "STOLI" 4-a trans-
action in which a third-party investor typically pays an upfront amount to an
individual insured under a new policy for which the investor pays premiums,
usually through a nonrecourse loan secured by the policy. At the end of the
contestability period typically imposed by insurers, the insured has the option
to allow the investor to foreclose on the policy or to keep the policy by repaying
the loan plus a (usually high) rate of interest." The latter option may be attrac-
59. Complaint, New York v. Coventry First LLC, No. 404620-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
26, 2oo6); Charles Duhigg & Joseph B. Treaster, Spitzer Suit Accuses Company of
Abuses in Insurance for Elderly and Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at C3.
6o. Trevor Thomas, Coventry Settles N.Y Case, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH
INs. NEws, Oct. 1, 20o9, available at http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/
News/2oog/io/Pages/Coventry-Settles-NY-Case.aspx.
61. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 29; Susan McRae, Victims Get Another Chance To
Win Back Swindled Funds, DAILY J. (L.A.), Sept. 25, 2002, at I (noting a settlement
provider executive's guilty plea to defrauding investors out of over $95 million);
Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Westlake Village
Man Who Orchestrated $64 Million Ponzi Scheme Sentenced to 25 Years in
Federal Prison (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http:/losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrelo9/laulo309.htm.
62. Life Terms in 'Black Widow' Case, WASH. POST, July 16, 2008, at A3.
63. Complaint for Forfeiture in rem, United States v. Four Million Dollars, No. O5-
CV-61399 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
64. Though STOLI remains technically legal in some jurisdictions, I discuss it mainly
as a form of fraud on insurers because most jurisdictions regard it as such.
65. J. Alan Jensen & Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: A
Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 ACTEC J. no, 1n (2007).
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tive to an insured whose health has worsened and who wants to retain the poli-
cy to benefit family members or to sell to other investors."
Though some argue that STOLI is not inherently problematic, 6, the prevail-
ing view holds the practice in disfavor. STOLI may sound purely beneficial to
potential insureds, who choose never to pay toward the policy, but a number of
hidden costs can arise. For example, after transferring the policy to investors, an
elderly individual may be unable to obtain other insurance because insurers will
count the transferred insurance against the individual's limited insurability. 9
Moreover, any benefits to the insured-including upfront gifts or forgiveness of
indebtedness at transfer-constitute income on which the insured must pay
taxes.7o
Most important from a public policy perspective, STOLI is a method of cir-
cumventing insurable interest laws.7' These laws render void all life insurance
contracts issued without an insurable interest, defined, for example, in New
York as:
(A) in the case of persons closely related by blood or by law, a substan-
tial interest engendered by love and affection;
(B) in the case of other persons, a lawful and substantial economic in-
terest in the continued life, health or bodily safety of the person in-
sured, as distinguished from an interest which would arise only by, or
would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement or injury of the
insured. 2
66. Id. at in.
67. Id. at no.
68. See generally Eryn Mathews, Note, STOLI on the Rocks: Why States Should Elimi-
nate the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 521
(2008) (discussing STOLI's risks to consumers, insurers, and investors).
69. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 65, at 115-16.
70. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (20o6); Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 65, at u16.
71. Mathews, supra note 68, at 527-28.
72. N.Y. INs. LAW § 3205(a)(1) (Consol. 2007). For other jurisdictions' insurable in-
terest laws, see, for example, CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1 (Deering 2007); D.C. CODE
§ 31-4716 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 627.404 (2oo9); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301 (2007).
Illinois requires insurable interest as a matter of common law. Guardian Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 8o Ill. 35, 39 (1875). Anglo-American insurable interest laws date
back to Britain's Life Assurance Act 1774, still in effect, which provides: "Whe-
reas ... the making insurances on lives ... wherein the assured shall have no in-
terest, hath introduced a mischievous kind of gaming: ... no insurance shall be
made by any person ... on the life ... of any person ... wherein the person ...
for whose ... benefit . .. such policy ... shall be made, shall have no interest....
Act of 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, § 1 (Eng.).
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Insurable interest laws have two purposes: prevention of gambling on the
lives of others, and avoidance of incentives for murder.3 When first recognizing
a right to policy resale, the U.S. Supreme Court also condemned what would
now be called STOLI: "cases in which a person having an interest lends himself
to one without any, as a cloak to what is, in its inception, a wager, have no simi-
larity to those where an honest contract is sold in good faith."74 The Southern
District of New York reiterated the sentiment in 2008:
Only one who obtains a life insurance policy on himself "on his own
initiative" and in good faith-that is, with a genuine intent to obtain
insurance protection for a family member, loved one, or business part-
ner, rather than an intent to disguise what would otherwise be a gam-
bling transaction by a stranger on his life-may freely assign the policy
to one who does not have an insurable interest in him.7 5
Many states have interpreted their insurable interest laws to prohibit STOLI
transactions/7 and many insurers have added questions to their application
forms aimed at discovering whether an application has been instigated by a
third party." Other states have outlawed STOLI, as discussed below, through
their broader regulation of viatical and life settlements.
73. See, e.g., Ben Kingree & Louise Tanner, Life Insurance as Motive for Murder, 29
TORT & INS. L.J. 761, 764 text accompanying nn.61-64 (1994) (discussing anti-
wagering and anti-murder rationales for insurable interest laws as well as insurers'
liability for "unreasonably imperilting] the lives of their insureds"). But see Jacob
Loshin, Note, Insurance Law's Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable In-
terest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474 (2007) (arguing that insurable interest laws
create moral hazard by relieving insurers of the need to ferret out uninsurability).
74. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911).
75. Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). But see
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Paulson, No. 07-3877, 2oo8 WL 451054, at *1 (D.
Minn. Feb. 15, 2008) (dismissing insurer's claim for failing to allege that any buyer
prompted insured to purchase policy).
76. See Op. Off. Gen. Counsel (N.Y. Jun. 3, 2003) (regarding New York's insurable
interest law, N.Y. INs. LAW § 3205 (McKinney Supp. 2003): "New York has a
strong public policy against speculation on the death of individuals. Accordingly,
one may not, with limited exceptions, take out a policy of life insurance on the life
of another."); IDAHO DEPT. OF INS., BULL. No. 07-03, STRANGER OR INVESTOR
OWNED LIFE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS (2007); LA. DEPT. OF INS., BULL. No.
o6-o5, AUTHORIZED AND UNAUTHORIZED QUESTIONS FOR USE ON A LIFE INSUR-
ANCE APPLICATION (2006); UTAH DEPT. OF INS., BULL. No. 2006-3, INSURABLE
INTEREST AND LIFE INSURANCE (2006).
77. Kelly J. Bozanic, Comment, An Investment To Die For: From Life Insurance to
Death Bonds, the Evolution and Legality of the Life Settlement Industry, 113 PENN ST.
L. REV. 229, 246 n.128 (2008).
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C. Regulation to Date
In the 1990s, states began adopting regulations to keep pace with changes in
the secondary market for life insurance. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in 2007
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act protects such state regulations from dormant
Commerce Clause preemption as state laws "relating" to or enacted "for the
purpose of' regulation of insurance.7' States have based much of their regula-
tion on two model acts. 9 The first, published in 1993 by the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), is the Viatical Settlement Model
Act.ao It requires settlement providers to make certain disclosures to viators"
and investors;" to obtain a license to sell life insurance from the insurance
commission of the viator's state of residence;" and to obtain the commission-
er's approval for the settlement contract forms they use.84 The Act also contains
privacy protections, generally barring disclosure of a viator's identity." NAIC
broadened its Model Act in 2000 to include settlements for viators who are not
terminally ill, thus encompassing what the industry refers to as life settlements
within the definition of viatical settlements." In accompanying regulations,
NAIC proposes minimum prices for settlements, based on percentages of a pol-
icy's face value."?
The second model law is the Life Settlements Model Act published by the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) in 2ooo, amended in
78. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (2006)).
79. For fuller discussion of state regulation and the model acts, see generally Sachin
Kohli, Comment, Pricing Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market for Life Insurance
Policies and Its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 279, 303-13 (20o6) (ad-
dressing ways legislation can improve the secondary market for life insurance);
Jessica Maria Perez, Note, You Can Bet Your Life on It! Regulating Senior Settle-
ments To Be a Financial Alternative for the Elderly, 1o ELDER L.J. 425 (2002) (dis-
cussing how state statutes can protect the elderly from fraud, and can make life in-
surance settlements more feasible as investment options).
80. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat'l Assoc. of Ins. Comm'rs 1993).
81. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 8(A)-(D) (Nat'l Assoc. of Ins. Comm'rs
2008).
82. Id. § 8(E)-(F).
83. Id. § 3.
84. Id. § 5.
85. Id. § 6(B).
86. VIArICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(R) (Nat'l Assoc. of Ins. Comm'rs 2000).
87. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 5, Alternative I (Nat'l Assoc. of
Ins. Comm'rs 2008). For discussion of how price floors function to prevent oth-
erwise socially beneficial transactions, see Jay Battacharya et al., Price Regulation in
Secondary Insurance Markets, 71 J. RISK & INs. 643, 660 (2004).
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2004 and 2007." Like the NAIC Act, NCOIL's proposed law includes disclo-
sure,9 privacy,9 o and licensing1 requirements, but does not put forward any
pricing regulations. NCOIL's proposal also limits investor contact with the pol-
icy-seller to once every three months for those with life expectancies over one
year, and once per month for those with life expectancies of one year or less.92
Both the NAIC and NCOIL model acts have been updated to combat
STOLI transactions. NAIC amendments adopted in 2007 generally mandate a
five-year waiting period from policy issuance to sale, though broad exceptions
allow earlier settlement in the case of retirement, divorce, loss of employment,
or spouse's death. Settlements are allowed after two years for policies that are
independently funded and for which there has been no agreement or evaluation
for settlement.93 The Life Insurance Settlement Association (LISA), an industry
group, argues that the NAIC amendments are overbroad and threaten to block
legitimate settlements.94 LISA prefers the NCOIL model, which calls for only a
two-year waiting period.9
In all, forty-four states have enacted some regulation of life insurance set-
tlements (though four regulate only settlements for the terminally or chronical-
ly ill, and one, Arizona, has only a STOLI prohibition).9' Fraud in the life insur-
ance settlement market has decreased since adoption of these regulations. LISA
reports that NAIC's Complaints Database (generally available only to regula-
tors) has registered only nine complaints since 2005,91 and NAIC asserts that
"most settlement frauds now involve the investor side of the transaction, not
the insurance policyholder side."
88. LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL AcT (Nat'l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007), available at
http://www.thevoiceoftheindustry.com/files/ncoil-2007-NCOILLifeSettlements
Model ActADOPTED1-16-o7_CLEANCOPY.pdf.
89. Id. § 9.
90. Id. § 6.
91. Id. § 3.
92. Id. § 9(A)(13).
93. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 81, § ni(A).
94. See Bozanic, supra note 77, at n.u8.
95. See LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 88, § n(N); NCOIL Model Act,
LIFE INSURANCE SETTLEMENT ASSOCIATION, http://www.lisassociation.org/
lifesettlementtruth/NCOIL.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
96. See Regulation of Viatical and Life Settlements, LIFE INSURANCE SETTLEMENT As-
SOCIATION, (Nov. 1, 2o), http://www.lisassociation.orgvisaamemberslegislative
.maps/images/Reg-of-viatical-and-life-se.jpg.
97. Securitization Hearings, supra note 17, at 47 (statement of J. Russel Dorsett, Presi-
dent, Life Insurance Settlement Association).
98. Doherty & Singer, supra note 30, at 477 n.76.
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Meanwhile, federal regulation of viatical and life settlements is in flux. The
SEC has asserted: "ILIife settlements are securities, and, therefore, are subject to
the requirements of the federal securities laws, including the antifraud rules."99
The D.C. Circuit has disagreed, ruling in the 1996 case SEC v. Life Partners that
life insurance settlements are not securities under current federal law.' Then-
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Circuit that the settlements' status as
securities depends on the test laid out in SEC v. W.. Howey Co., which requires
"(1) an expectation of profits arising from (2) a common enterprise that (3) de-
pends upon the efforts of others."0. The court held that the fractional interests
of settlements in question met the first two prongs but not the third because the
investors' profits depended on the death of the policy-seller, not any post-sale
entrepreneurial efforts of settlement arrangers.20 2
In the 2007 decision SEC v. Mutual Benefits, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the rule adopted by the D.C. Circuit.0 3 That court held that life insurance set-
tlements are securities under Howey's broad interpretation of the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934, noting that the D.C. Circuit's distinction between pre- and
post-sale effort was novel and not envisioned by the holding in Howey.o Sever-
al states also interpret their own securities laws to cover settlement contracts.'o
This Note will focus on regulation applied directly to life settlement securitiza-
tions, but the foregoing state and federal regulations give an important indica-
tion of the regulatory standards and disclosure requirements that must be met
by insurance settlements before they become part of any securitization.
99. Securitization Hearings, supra note 17, at 59 (statement of Paula Dubberly, Asso-
ciate Director, Division of Corporate Finance, United States Securities and Ex-
change Commission).
ioo. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 542 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)).
102. Id. at 549.
103. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (nth Cir. 2005).
104. Id. at 743-45; see also Wuliger v. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 814, 824 (N.D. Ohio 2006)
(rejecting the Life Partners rule in adopting the broader Howey interpretation).
105. See, e.g., Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92, 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) ("(Tlhe fact
that Idefendant's) efforts preceded the sale of interests in viatical settlements to its
investors does not change the nature of the investment."); Sec. Comm'r for Colo.
v. Viatica Mgmt. LLC, 55 P-3d 264 (Colo. App. 2002); Sec. Trust Corp. v. Fisher,
797 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (same); Poyser v. Flora, 780 N.E.2d 1191, 1195
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a viatical settlement is an "investment contract"
that meets the Indiana Code's definition of "security"); Michelson v. Voison, 658
N.W.2d 188 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (deferring to state agency interpretation of
Michigan securities laws that viatical settlements are securities).
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D. Recent Market Trends and Moves Toward Securitization
This Section describes the current state of the insurance settlement market
and its movements towards securitization. Though it is the focus of significant
regulation, the current market for life insurance settlements is modest in size.
Based on an estimated so billion paid for settlements between 1999 and 2009,
LISA judges that policy-sellers received $6-7 billion more than they would have
by surrendering their policies to insurers.' Meanwhile, Bernstein & Co. esti-
mates that investors earn 9-13% on a settlement investment of average duration
with death seven to eight years after sale.o 7 Outside that range, investors' esti-
mated profits are highly sensitive to seller life spans: 1ol% for death within two
years, but dropping to 3% for death eleven years after sale."'
Conning & Company estimates that at the end of 2007, there were roughly
$31 billion in outstanding settlements measured by policy face value,o 9 but LISA
estimates that by 20o8, $3-4 billion in capital was invested per year in viatical
and life settlements worth $12-15 billion in policy face value.1 o However, the in-
dustry was hit hard by the credit crisis of 2008 and 2009. Investment in 2009
appears to have fallen by more than 50% from 2008 levels, due largely to a lack
of available investment capital.'" In 20o, Goldman Sachs abandoned the life
settlement industry, though some attribute the move to a desire to avoid nega-
tive publicity from dealing in death benefits."'
Still, there is significant potential for growth in the life settlement industry.
Strong expectations of future market growth are driven in large part by pro-
jected growth in the elderly population of the United States. According to Cen-
sus Bureau analysis, the population of Americans over sixty-five will swell
beyond seventy-two million by 2030 (from a current level just over forty mil-
1o6. Trevor Thomas, Life Settlement Regulation Proliferated, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
LIFE & HEALTH INs. NEws, Dec. 28, 2009, available at http://www
.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/Top-Ten-Stories-2009/Pages/Life-Settlement-
Regulation-Proliferated.aspx.
107. KAMATH & SLEDGE, supra note 36, at 5.
108. Id.
109. Jamie McGee, Life Settlement 'Hit Hard' by Recession, Conning Says, BLOOMBERG,
Oct. 8, 2009, http:/fwww.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aAzY2pJtwlTo.
no. Securitization Hearings, supra note 17, at 9, 13 (statement of J. Russel Dorsett, Pres-
ident, Life Insurance Settlement Association).
In. Id.
112. Trevor Thomas, Execs React to Goldman Shuttering Its Settlement Unit, NAT'L UN-
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lion)."' While (pre-Great Recession) studies indicate that roughly half of the
Baby Boomers are preparing adequately to maintain their standards of living
into retirement, many are not."4 Though non-savers tend to be poorer and,
therefore, less likely to own life insurance,"' those who do have policies will still
face increasing reason to sell. There are also reports of increasing availability of
life settlements to insureds with low-face-value policies."'
Inspired by these prospects for growth, investors have begun contemplating
the securitization of life settlements. Like other types of securitization, the
process for securitizing life insurance policies entails pooling large numbers of
payment obligations as collateral for an issuance of bonds, which are referred to
as asset-backed securities (ABS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) ."7
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) rate the investment risk of these financial in-
struments-as they do other bonds-usually on letter-based scales where a
greater number of As indicates lower risk. In order to win higher credit ratings
(and therefore higher sales prices), securitizers generally transfer the assets they
wish to securitize into a bankruptcy-remote trust (often referred to as a "special
purpose vehicle" or "SPV"). This protects investors from the risk of securitizer
insolvency because the assets underlying the investors' bonds are then generally
unavailable to pay off the securitizer's debts. Courts will respect such bankrupt-
cy remoteness, however, only if they find that there has been a "true sale" by the
arranger to the SPV."
Bonds are issued in levels or tranches, guaranteeing the first profits to hold-
ers of the senior-most tranche, ideally characterized by very low risk and a very
113. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010, tbl.8,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/20o9pubs/iostatab/pop.pdf.
114. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BABY BOOMERS' RETIREMENT PROSPECTS: AN
OVERVIEW 2 (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4863/u-26-
BabyBoomers.pdf.
115. John J. Burnett & Bruce A. Palmer, Examining Life Insurance Ownership Through
Demographic and Psychographic Characteristics, 51 J. RISK & INS. 453 (1984).
116. Linda Koco, Settlements of Small Face Policies Start To Emerge, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH INS. NEWS, Sept. 2, 2008, available at
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/Exclusives/2008/o9/Pages/Feature-
Settlements-of-small-face-policies-start-to-emerge.aspx.
n7. See S.L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL
MARKETs § 1(2004).
118. Id. §§ 3 .03(A)-(B). For a definition of "true sale," see Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Parts Are Greater than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Re-
volutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle Market
Companies, 1993 COLLUm. Bus. L. REV. 139, 143 (1993) ("Sales that are effective
against creditors and the estate of a bankrupt originator, in that the property is no
longer 'property of the debtor's estate' under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,
are generally referred to as 'true sales."' (footnote omitted)).
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high credit rating."9 The theory of securitization relies in significant part on the
law of large numbers: "if a pool is extremely diversified, with large numbers of
obligors each liable for a small percentage of the dollar amount of the pool, one
may more confidently rely on the statistical history of the pool.""o
Securitization has been credited for much of the tremendous growth of the
U.S. financial sector over recent decades but also blamed as a cause of the Great
Recession."' The New York Times article that sparked Congress's interest in life
settlement securitization commented on a similar duality: the potential for
profit in a new financial product, coupled with the fear of a new market crisis."'
In fact, however, securitization has existed in the realm of insurance for some
time but has been focused on assets and risks other than life settlements."3
These are generally ways for insurers to spread risk. For example, in natural ca-
tastrophe bonds ("cat bonds"), insurers sell promises to pay high yields, except
in the event of a natural disaster of designated magnitude. Since the insurer
keeps funds in such a contingency, the insurer is effectively shielded from the
risk of natural disasters that give rise to significant insurance claims.'"4 Mortality
cat bonds perform a similar function, but only if an event causes deaths beyond
a specified threshold."' As such, recent fears of an HiNi swine flu pandemic
stirred interest in increased insurer-side securitization of life insurance through
mortality cat bonds."'
More traditionally, insurers have sought protection from excessive claims
by purchasing reinsurance. Reinsurance providers also seek to smooth their risk
profiles in the retrocessional market-essentially the market for reinsurance of
reinsurance liabilities. Increasingly, reinsurance providers are also sharing their
risks with capital markets through securitization."' In 2005, reinsurer Swiss Re
up. Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 136-37.
120. SCHWARCZ ET AL., supra note 117, § 1.o3(A). For general information on the law of
large numbers, see GEOFFREY R. GRIMMETT & DAvID R. STIRZAKER, PROBABILITY
AND RANDOM PROCESSES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONs (1993).
121. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit De-
rivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007).
122. See Anderson, supra note 27.
123. See Alex Cowley & J. David Cummins, Securitization of Life Insurance Assets and
Liabilities, 72 1. RIsK & INS. 193, 194 (2005).
124. A.M. BEST Co., THE GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE RATINGS 16 (2009).
125. Id. at 17.
126. Colleen McCarthy, Pandemic Fears May Trigger More Securitizations, Bus. INs.,
Oct. 26, 2009, at 19, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/
200910251ISSUEo3/310259994.
127. Regis Coccia, Retrocessional Market Options Ride on Securitization, Bus. INS., Sept.
21, 2oo9, at 17, available at http://www.businessinsurance.comarticle/2oo9o92o/
ISSUEO3/3o92o9992.
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issued bonds for $245 million backed by a pool of life insurance policies the firm
had reinsured."' Note that such securitization is a mirror image of life settle-
ment securitization: instead of insureds selling their claims to death benefits
that are then pooled, insurers sell their claims to premium streams that are then
pooled and collateralized. As life settlement investors stand to profit by the early
deaths of policy-sellers, investors in reinsurance recoverables profit from the
greater longevity of insureds.
Unlike these insurer-side securitizations, however, life settlement securiti-
zation is yet a nascent field. Moreover, most life settlement securitizations are
executed as private placements, so data on them is not generally available."'9 A
1995 report refers to an early securitization by Ironwood Capital Partners of
viatical settlements of AIDS victims with a combined face value of $35 million.13 o
Since then, only a few life settlement securitizations have been reported public-
ly. Legacy Benefits Life Insurance Settlements issued bonds in 2004 on a $70.3
million face value pool of policies and annuities. Moody's rated the bonds Ai
and Baa2, based on "mortality projections .. . [and] the credit quality of the in-
surance and annuity providers, most of which currently hold a Moody's finan-
cial strength rating of Aa3 or better . . ."'I' Moody's ratings utilized Monte Car-
lo simulation, a method of modeling random events, to gauge policy-seller
mortality, testing the medical assessments by Legacy's hired evaluators."' Risk
Finance, a subsidiary of the troubled American International Group (AIG), ex-
ecuted a larger securitization in 2009. A.M. Best Co. rated the bonds, which
were worth over $2 billion and backed by life insurance policies with combined
face value of $8.4 billion."' These few publicly known securitizations have
grown significantly in value but so far "appear to have had little or no impact
on the life settlement or life insurance markets."3 4
128. Press Release, Swiss Re, Swiss Re Completes USD 245 Million Securitisation of
In-Force Life Insurance Policies (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.swissre
.com/media/news-releases/swiss-re-completes usd_245_million securitisation_
ofin-force life insurance-policies.htmi.
129. Securitization Hearings, supra note 17, at 3 (statement of Daniel Curry, President,
DBRS Inc.).
130. Life Insurance Policies of AIDS Patients Packaged as Securities, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 2,
1995-
131. Press Release, Moody's Investor Serv., Moody's Rates Legacy Life Settlement Se-
curitization Ai and Baa2 (Mar. 16, 2004), available at http://legacybenefits.com/
images/docIMoodys_2oPress_2oRelease-031604.pdf.
132. Id. For an example of Monte Carlo simulation applied to health outcomes, see
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier & Suzanna De Boef, Repeated Events Survival Models:
The Conditional Frailty Model, 25 STAT. MEDICINE 3518 (20o6).
133. Nancy Leinfuss, Wall Street Plays Death Card in Securitization Market, REUTERS,
July 31, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE56U5UX2090731.
134. Arthur D. Postal, Life Settlement Securitizations Pose No Systematic Threat, LISA
Asserts, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH INS. NEws, Oct. 5, 2009, available at
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E. Reactions to Life Settlement Securitization
Securitization has been limited, in part, because market participants remain
wary of the risks and difficulties particular to securitizing life insurance prod-
ucts. Standard & Poor's (S&P), for example, has said it does not plan to rate life
settlement securitizations for the foreseeable future.'-" Chief among the firm's
reasons was the still limited supply of policies, which has prevented many
would-be securitizers from gathering enough policies to achieve statistical cre-
dibility. S&P also cited legal concerns that underlying policies might be deemed
void for lack of insurable interest, presumably as a result of STOLL S&P further
noted that there is yet little data comparing mortality projections to actual out-
comes. Settlement providers do not retain enough risk in securitizations, and
settlement securitizations may in fact be correlated to other economic risks be-
cause, if an economic downturn causes insurer insolvencies, traditional benefi-
ciaries may receive superior treatment to investors.36
In February 2010, the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) called for
life settlement securitization to be prohibited by legislation or regulation."' The
group asserted that securitization would encourage settlement providers to prey
on elderly insureds and to instigate STOLI transactions. Further, securitization
would create untenable risks for investors because settlement providers would
be separated from risk, STOLI losses would be total (unlike mortgage defaults,
which at least leave investors with a physical asset), and securitizers would not
be able-partly because of privacy protections-to share enough information
for investors to conduct sufficient due diligence."'
The Institutional Life Markets Association (ILMA) accused ACLI of con-
fusing STOLI with bona fide life settlements. ILMA's statement named several
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/Issues/2009/Oct-5th-2009/Pages/
Life-Settlement-Securitizations-Pose-No-Systemic-Threat-LISA-Asserts.aspx
(quoting Steven H. Strongin, Managing Director, Head of Global Investment Re-
search, Goldman, Sachs & Co.).
135. Trevor Thomas, Life Settlement Securitizations Leave S&P Cold, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER LIFE & HEALTH INS. NEWS, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://
www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/News/2009olPages/Life+Settlement-
Securitizations-Leave-SP-Cold.aspx?co.; see also A.M. BEST Co., A.M. BEST
METHODOLOGY: LIFE SETTLEMENT SECURITIZATION 1 (2009), available at http://
www.ambest.com/debt/lifesettlement.pdf (explaining why life settlement securiti-
zations are rare).
136. Thomas, supra note 135.
137. Press Release, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Statement of the ACLI Regarding Se-




138. Id. at 1-2.
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benefits of securitization, including lowering the cost of borrowing for settle-
ment providers and professionalizing the asset management and servicing of
policies.' 39 LISA echoed ILMA, stating that the ACLI statement was "sensationa-
listic nonsense," denying that securitization would increase incentives for
STOLI, and arguing that unscrupulous insurance agents are the root of the
STOLI problem.4 o
Life settlement executives made similar responses to a September 2009 New
York Times article. One provider, David Mickelson, asserted that life settlement
securitization would not create the risks attributed to MBS. He pointed out:
"[E] ach policy has the backing of an insurance institution with a rating no low-
er than AA . .. And the insurance industry has a perfect record of always paying
death claims." 4' The assertion is true,"4 though many states' insurance guaranty
laws cover life insurance claims up to only $300,000,43 which would reflect a
significant payout reduction for many high-face-value policies. Mickelson add-
ed that an elderly person's longevity is very unlikely to be extended by more
than twenty to forty months'4-but analysis indicates that a forty-month ex-
tension on an average policy could reduce investor profit from 13% to less than
5%.
Life settlement-backed CDOs are already considered securities by the SEC.
However, noting the "potentially far-reaching consequences of the recent
movement toward securitization of life settlements," the SEC has established a
Life Settlements Task Force to explore regulatory options for the future.4' This
Note similarly seeks to determine whether life settlement securitizations could
create problems-particularly problems that resemble causes of the late finan-
cial crisis.
139. Press Release, Institutional Life Mkts. Ass'n, ACLI Mixes "Apples and
Oranges" to Mislead Consumers (Feb. 4, 20o0), available at
http://www.lifemarketsassociation.org/documents/PR-%2oACLI%2omisleads.pdf
140. Bob Graham, Life Insurers, Life Settlement Group Spar over Securitization, INs. &
FIN. ADvisoR, Feb. 9, 2oo, http://ifawebnews.com/2010/o2/og/ife-insurers-life-
settlement-group-spar-over-securitization.
141. Trevor Thomas, Settlement Executives Comment on Times Article, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER LIFE & HEALTH INS. NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/Exclusives/20o9/o9/Pages/Feature-
Settlement-executives-comment-on-Times-article.aspx.
142. Louis A. MEZZULLO, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S GUIDE To LIFE INSURANCE 2 (2000).
143. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 631.717(9) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §
146B(4 )(B)( 3 )(b)(i) (2009), VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1704(I)(2)(a) (2010).
144. Thomas, supra note 141.
145. KAMATH & SLEDGE, supra note 36, at 5, ex.6.
146. Securitization Hearings, supra note 17, at 4 (statement of Paula Dubberly, Associate
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11. FRICTIONS AND RISKS IN VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENT SECURITIZATION
This Part compares the securitization process for life insurance settlements
to that for mortgages, focusing on the sources of risk that have contributed to
the recent financial crisis. In establishing a framework for this discussion, I
draw on the analysis of subprime mortgage securitization conducted by Adam
Ashcraft and Til Schuermann of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.'47 Their
work represents the consensus view * of the sources of risk in mortgage securi-
tization and identifies seven "key frictions"-interactions between actors in
which divergent interests and informational disparities or deficiencies have po-
tential to increase risk. These are frictions between: (i) mortgagor and lender;
(2) lender and securitization arranger; (3) arranger and third parties; (4) servic-
er and mortgagor; (5) servicer and third parties; (6) asset manager and investor;
and (7) investor and credit rating agencies. The authors explain how "tffive
frictions caused the subprime crisis": frictions 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7.149
Before comparing securitization in mortgages and life settlements, it is im-
portant to clarify how roles in the two processes correspond to each other. Most
importantly, the individual insured in a life insurance settlement corresponds to
the lender in a mortgage transaction, not the borrower: the lender and the in-
sured are the two parties who sell their contractual entitlements for securitiza-
tion.'o Likewise, insurers and mortgagors are the parties whose payments fund
the payouts of asset-backed bonds.
The remaining actors correspond in a fairly straightforward manner. A life
settlement provider plays the part of the arranger who buys the contractual
right and organizes a securitization. For the sake of simplicity, I generally as-
sume (as Ashcraft and Schuermann do)' that each of the roles described above
is played by a single party. In the mortgage context, there is often a broker who
brings together a borrower and a lender."' An individual typically buys an in-
surance policy through an insurance agent, who represents any number of in-
surers in sales but is not directly employed by any one insurance firm. Brokers
can also bring together buyers and sellers in the secondary market for life insur-
147. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21.
148. Ashcraft and Schuermann's work is valuable because it outlines the universe of
factors that observers have found important to explaining the financial crisis,
though there is naturally disagreement over which sources of risk are most impor-
tant. Some commentators argue, for example, that the originate-to-distribute
lending model, infra note 160 and accompanying text, was not particularly in-
fluential in the current crisis. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 1318-21.
149. See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at i-ii.
150. Doherty & Singer, supra note 30, at 457-58.
151. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 5.
152. Id.
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ance.1" Finally, life settlement providers may sell policies to an independent
entity that arranges securitization.' 4 An additional intermediary means an addi-
tional point of friction that can increase risk.' These intermediaries are not,
however, essential to securitization, and this Note will only discuss the addi-
tional problems they may create (agency issues and information asymmetries)
when particularly important. The relevant third parties in the mortgage context
are CRAs and asset managers (agents of investors)."' The same is true for insur-
ance settlement securitization, with the addition of medical underwriters who
provide life expectancy analysis to support the settlement provider and rating
agency.15 7 Finally, the roles of servicers, asset managers, and investors are ana-
logous in the two securitization contexts.
Of the seven frictions identified by Ashcraft and Schuermann, five are
found in both mortgage and life settlement securitization. This Part does not
extensively discuss the two other frictions, which are not relevant to insurance
settlement securitization.5' This Part also identifies three frictions unique to in-
surance settlement securitization. These frictions concern the special relation-
ships between (8) investors and insurers' other creditors; (9) investors and insu-
reds; and (io) investors and insureds' survivors. A concluding Section presents
153. Treaster, supra note 53.
154. A.M. BEST Co., supra note 135, at ii.
155. Such intermediaries have indeed caused problems in the life settlement industry.
Recall New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's allegations of a life settlement
provider's bribing brokers to ignore other providers' bids. See Complaint, supra
note 59, at 2.
156. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 6-7. I do not discuss warehouse lenders,
to which Ashcraft and Schuermann give some attention. Id.
157. A.M. BEST CO., supra note 135, at 1, 5.
158. These frictions-4 and 5-both involve the mortgage servicer employed by an
SPV to collect payments, provide customer service to mortgagors, supervise forec-
losures, and handle other administrative tasks. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra
note 21, at i, 7. Life settlement securitizations also require servicers to monitor the
life/death status of insureds and perhaps collect death benefits from insurers.
A.M. BEST Co., supra note 135, at 2. However, this servicer would not encounter
the same frictions seen in mortgage securitization. Friction 4 reflects moral hazard
in a mortgagor's reduced incentive to care for property once a servicer appears
likely to foreclose. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at i, 7. Insurers on the
other hand have strong incentives to pay death benefits (judicial contract en-
forcement and reputational incentives). Friction 5 concerns servicers' incentives
to delay foreclosure and continue collecting fees at the expense of investors and
others. Id. at i-ii, 8-9. Life settlement servicers may also want to keep policies on
the books, but they have little ability to delay a policy's end. Ashcraft and
Schuermann also note that mortgage servicers have incentive to inflate reimburs-
able expenses incurred during foreclosures. Id. Life settlement servicers have a
similar incentive but no duty as costly as foreclosure. Any effect of this moral ha-
zard promises to be minor.
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findings on the overall similarity in risk structure between the two types of se-
curitization and how risks might be realized in an enlarged market for life set-
tlement-backed securities.
A. Frictions Common to Mortgage and Insurance Settlement Securitization
Five frictions in mortgage securitization-precisely the ones identified as
causing the subprime crisis-also appear in life settlement securitization. They
are the frictions between: (i) mortgagor/insurer and lender/insured; (2) lend-
er/insured and securitization arranger/settlement provider-arranger; (3) arran-
ger/settlement provider-arranger and third parties; (6) asset manager and inves-
tor; and (7) investor and CRAs.'59 This Section demonstrates how each friction
functions in the two contexts.
Friction i: Insurer and Insured. In the mortgage context, this friction takes
the form of a lender's originate-to-distribute mindset and predatory lending.
That is, lenders who believe they can lend more than the borrower can repay
but nevertheless sell the loan have an incentive to lend too much.'o This ten-
dency mirrors the incentive of borrowers, particularly unsophisticated ones
motivated by pressing short-term needs, to borrow too much.'' The risk is
straightforward: a borrower with too large a loan is likely to default to the de-
triment of whoever bears the loan's credit risk.
In the life insurance context, the friction between insurer and insured cen-
ters on STOLI and insurance fraud." Insurers stand to lose when they are de-
frauded into accepting risk they would normally refuse, given honest informa-
tion. As discussed above, policies transferred to investors are far less likely to
lapse than insurers project, magnifying the effects of such fraud."6 Even if fraud
or policy-voiding STOLI is discovered, insurers are likely to suffer the costs of
litigating disputes.6 4
For a securitization, however, the greater significance of fraud and STOLI is
that courts may find the associated insurance contracts void ab initio.'", A secu-
159. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at i-ii.
160. For a fuller discussion of originate-to-distribute, see Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did
Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans (Dec. 25,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137.
161. Ashcraft and Schuermann limit their discussion of Friction i to predatory lending
but later note that the same transaction could be construed as either predatory
lending or borrowing. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 5-6.
162. I focus on the relationship between insurers and individual insureds, but it should
be noted that employers and creditors can also buy and sell insurance on the lives
of employees and borrowers.
163. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
164. Jensen & Leimberg, supra note 65, at 123.
165. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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ritized pool of policies would lose all value attributed to the voided policies, and
bondholders' profits would be reduced, absent recovery from the insured (or
the insured's estate), the settlement provider, or another intermediary. Inves-
tors have a strong argument that policy sales into the SPV include implied war-
ranties that the policies were legal and valid-unless such warranties are expli-
citly eliminated through contract. 6" Even with warranties, though, investors
would likely incur significant litigation costs to pursue recovery-and may still
fail to recover if defendants cannot pay.
This discussion raises the question posed by ACLI: Will securitization en-
courage an increase in STOLI transactions or other types of fraud by insurance
applicants? Securitization is likely to encourage both. As Steven Schwarcz dis-
cusses, "securitization of a flawed asset type can motivate greater origination of
that asset type."' Securitization serves-ideally-to isolate and clarify risk. In-
vestors are willing to pay more for such clarity. Higher prices in turn increase
demand in the secondary market for the underlying assets."' To any individuals
and settlement providers who perceive the ability to sell or securitize policies
with limited exposure to risk, higher prices on the secondary market provide
incentives to engage in fraud. Furthermore, the information advantage of insur-
ance applicants, who are intimately aware of their own health, facilitates the ex-
ecution of fraud.
The flip side of this friction is not a concern in settlement securitization.
While the mortgage securitization business must contend with both predatory
borrowing and lending, there is no significant risk of insurers issuing policies
against their own economic interest. A lender who is divorced from default risk
and an unsophisticated borrower who is interested in near-term cash may both
eagerly agree to oversized loans. Insurers are sophisticated parties, quite cogni-
zant of traditional risks, and interested in long-term profit; their goal is to in-
sure healthy people who live for many years, not to insure those near death.
Still, some proponents of life settlements have accused insurance agents of inef-
fective (i) discovery and (ii) denial of STOLI applications. 9
Friction 2: Insured and Settlement Provider. When a lender sells loans to a
securitization arranger, the lender has a strong information advantage regarding
the credit-worthiness of borrowers. Further, the lender has incentive to exagge-
rate the quality of the loan to achieve a higher sales price. The general solution
t66. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 125 (2010) ("Although an assignment is made
'without recourse,' there is an implied warranty that the right as assigned actually
exists and is subject to no limitations or defenses other than those stated or appar-
ent at the time of the assignment." (citing Penowa Coal Sales Co. v. Gibbs & Co.,
85 A.2d 464 (Md. 1952)); Cf U.C.C. § 2-315 (2004) (imposing implied warranties in
the sale of goods).
167. Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 1318.
168. After securitization of subprime mortgages began, origination and issuance of
such mortgages rose significantly. See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 2.
169. See Graham, supra note 140.
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to such friction is due diligence by the arranger, 7 o but arrangers may have con-
tributed to the recent crisis through their carelessness.' In addition, the lender
usually makes representations and warranties (R&W) about the mortgagor and
underwriting process that, if violated, may obligate the lender to repurchase the
affected loans.'72
The same is true of an insured negotiating the sale of a policy to a settle-
ment provider. The insured knows more about his or her own health and has
an incentive to exaggerate health problems to win a higher sales price. Like
mortgage securitization arrangers, settlement providers attempt to resolve this
friction through due diligence, provided in part by medical underwriters.1
These underwriters are engaged by settlement providers to examine medical
records and estimate life expectancies of would-be policy-sellers.'74 The under-
writers typically use a system developed by reinsurers to measure an insured's
mortality risk based on demonstrated medical conditions against a standard
risk. Most medical underwriters today reportedly base their calculations on a
common dataset, the 2008 Valuation Basic Table 75
A.M. Best reports, however, that medical underwriters do not have a strong
record of accurately estimating life expectancies. In a comparative study by
A.M. Best, three medical underwriters produced widely divergent life expectan-
cies for the same group of two hundred lives: Average life expectancies from
two of the firms were twenty-four months apart. However, A.M. Best says that
the underwriters have improved their accuracy over time and may improve fur-
ther as more historical data becomes available.76
Still, the errors in life expectancy predictions and market intermediaries'
incentives to exploit such error remain significant. Policy-sellers do provide in-
formation about their health status to settlement providers just as lenders make
R&Ws regarding mortgages. However, the ultimate owner of the policy is likely
stuck with any losses, unless they can prove fraud by the insured.
Friction 3: Settlement Provider/Securitization Arranger and Third Parties. A
mortgage securitization arranger may have an incentive to keep the most prom-
ising mortgages for itself and securitize the rest.'"' The arranger can accomplish
170. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 5-6.
171. Patrick Rucker, Wall Street Often Shelved Damaging Subprime Reports, REUTERS,
July 27, 2007, http:lwww.reuters.com/article/idUSN27435i5820070727.
172. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 5-6.
173. A.M. BEST Co., supra note 135, at eX.2, 5-10.
174. Id. at ex.2 (noting that when a provider intends to re-sell the policy to a separate
securities issuer, industry standards call for the provider to engage at least two
medical underwriters).
175. Id. at 5-6.
176. Id. at 7-8; see also Thomas, supra note 135 (noting S&P's observation that there is
currently insufficient data comparing projected to actual mortality).
177. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 6.
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this adverse selection because of the information advantage it has over third
parties: the arranger knows more about the loans than do either the credit rat-
ing agency or investors or their asset managers. A classic "lemons problem"
may result: buyers distrust sellers and discount their offers, which incentivizes
sellers to hold back more top-quality assets, and a market-destructive cycle be-
gins."' Alternatively, buyers may overly trust sellers and pay high prices for
risky investments. This friction is exacerbated if the arranger does not retain
ownership of any of the securities issued-especially the most junior, equity
tranche of bonds. The arranger is then completely divorced from the risk that
the securities will fail to generate profit.' 9 The arranger's incentive becomes
maximizing the sales price, not ensuring the quality of the underlying assets.
A well-functioning market mitigates such problems. Since securitization ar-
rangers must depend on their reputations to sell investments, they have incen-
tives to ensure their customers' satisfaction with the purchase price and profit
earned. Due diligence by investors, asset managers, and CRAs should help as-
sure that prices are reasonable."'o As the subprime crisis demonstrated, howev-
er, these safeguards are not foolproof.
In a life settlement securitization, the lemons problem is lessened when
more individualized data is available to all parties, reducing the settlement pro-
vider's informational advantage. While settlement providers have the same mo-
tivation to retain the best assets in-house, they may be forced to share medical
and other information regarding the policies to be securitized (though not pa-
tient identities protected by privacy laws). Third parties in a mortgage securiti-
zation make generalized estimations about default rates based on demographic
information such as local "unemployment rates, interest rates, and home price
appreciation.""' Third parties in life settlement securitizations are better able to
base their decisions on relatively specific information about each patient's med-
ical condition. Knowing that a pool of insureds includes victims of certain dis-
eases diagnosed at certain times is simply more helpful in estimating life expec-
tancies than is information on mortgagors' neighborhoods in projecting default
rates. Whereas arrangers have a relative advantage in predicting which mortga-
gors are likely to make their payments, a settlement provider is on more equal
footing with third parties in estimating when a given insured will die. Still, the
incentive to raise the sale price persists, as does the friction. The settlement pro-
vider-arranger always wants to make its assets appear more valuable than they
truly are, especially if the arranger retains no ownership of the securities issued.
178. Id. at 6-7.
179. Id. at 12.
180. Id. at 6-7.
181. Id. at 43.
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Friction 6: Asset Manager and Investor. This friction is a classic principal-
agent problem.' Unsophisticated investors-pensioners in a pension fund, for
example-typically employ a portfolio or asset manager to handle their invest-
ments. These investors may be ill-equipped to distinguish between a savvy
manager and one that is less capable. Since these investors will not closely
monitor their investments, the asset manager has reduced incentive to conduct
thorough due diligence.8 Fiduciary obligations of investment advisors do re-
duce this friction, but such obligations are typically weak, requiring only a mi-
nimal level of care.184 The friction is further mitigated by evaluations of asset
managers against benchmarks or peers-or by restricting the investments that
asset managers can make. If these restrictions are defined by credit ratings,
however, they serve to magnify the influence of credit ratings on investors' for-
tunes.' Friction 6 equally applies to life settlement securitization.
Friction 7: Investor and Credit Rating Agencies. CRAs created models to es-
timate the income expected from pools of mortgages and, therefore, the profit
expected from MBS.'86 Investors relied heavily on the resulting bond ratings.8 7
However, a host of weaknesses in the credit rating process caused CRAs to sig-
nal too much confidence in inherently risky assets. The most important of these
weaknesses arises because the mathematical structure of securitization causes
even small model errors to drastically distort expected income and the resulting
rating. This effect is magnified in what some refer to as CDO-squared (CDO'),
in which asset-backed securities themselves are pooled and resecuritized."'
Model errors can have any number of sources. For example, since CRAs
base their ratings on available historical data, errors become more likely-and
ratings become less reliable-when data is scarce. Wall Street faced such a pauc-
ity of data concerning default rates of subprime mortgages when it began secu-
ritizing them. 9 A second sort of error resulted from CRAs' misjudgment of
correlation among the events they were predicting, namely mortgage defaults.
CRAs did not sufficiently recognize that a default might reflect underlying con-
182. For a deeper discussion of principal-agent problems, see David E.M. Sappington,
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 45 (1991).
183. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 9-10.
184. See, e.g., Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 946-47 (9 th Cir. 2001) (affirming dis-
missal of investors' claims because advisors enjoyed Delaware's business judgment
protection).
185. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 9-lo.
186. Id. at 44.
187. Id. at 61-65.
88. See Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured
Finance, 23 J. EcON. PERSP. 3, 7, 9 (2009).
189. See id. at 15.
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ditions that raised the likelihood of many other, simultaneous defaults.'9 o For
example, a given default might correlate to many others because they are all
brought about by a downturn in the broader economy. As it happened, CRAs
often issued ratings to MBS without factoring in the possible ill-effects of an
economic recession.191 Other possible sources of model error include conflict of
interest for CRAs, which are typically paid by securitization arrangers,19 ' and
CRAs' hesitation to correct prior errors in order to protect their reputations. 93
All of these weaknesses in the credit rating process apply to securitization of
life settlements to differing degrees. Because life settlement securitizations share
the same structure as mortgage securitizations, the two also share the mathe-
matical vulnerability to even modest imprecision in model assumptions. How-
ever, as a result of the scarcity of settled policies, resecuritizations-creations of
life settlement-backed CDO'-are unlikely to occur.9 4 As such, the magnified
vulnerability of CDO' to model error is unlikely to affect life settlement securiti-
zation in the foreseeable future.
As they did with subprime securitizations, CRAs suffer from a lack of dense
historical data on which to base judgments about life settlement-backed securi-
ties. Medical underwriters are responsible for gauging life expectancies for insu-
reds represented in a pool of insurance policies, and, as noted above, their pre-
dictions are not reliably accurate,s1 This weakness may also be exacerbated by
the fact that CRAs receive life expectancy data from medical underwriters, often
with supporting proprietary calculations redacted. Thus the CRAs cannot make
independent judgments on the data.'9' As a result, while they may adjust life ex-
pectancies as they believe appropriate, CRAs necessarily base ratings in part on
faith that the medical underwriters' calculations are accurate. Additionally,
CRAs must estimate the extent to which STOLI will destroy value within a pool
of insurance policies. Here, too, reliable historical data is scarce.
190. See id. at 7, 16.
191. See id. at 17.
192. See Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied
Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obliga-
tion Market Disruptions (May 14, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1o27475.
193. Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 21, at 58-59.
194. Following the subprime panic, CDO' transactions may long remain rare for all
securitizations. See Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 1325.
195. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. While life expectancy data for the gen-
eral population is robust, data concerning insureds who sell their life insurance
policies is relatively new and thin. An A.M. Best finding that medical underwriters
have become more conservative in their life expectancy estimations may suggest,
unsurprisingly, that a person in this population typically lives longer than an av-
erage person of a similar profile from the general population. A.M. BEST CO., Su-
pra note 135, at 7.
196. A.M. BEST Co., supra note 135, at 19.
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Correlation risk applies to life insurance settlement investments, as demon-
strated by the viatical crash of the mid-199os in response to improved AIDS
medications.' 7 Investment in a pool of AIDS victims' insurance policies is vul-
nerable to the discovery of a cure, just as an MBS is vulnerable to any stimulus
that causes mortgagors to default simultaneously. However, this correlation risk
can be significantly mitigated through disease diversity. By ensuring that no one
disease affects too large a portion of a securitized pool of life insurance, arran-
gers and CRAs can limit-but not eliminate-the influence of new treatments
on investment value.9s CRAs must also contend with universally rising life ex-
pectancies, though sudden, dramatic, and widespread life expectancy extensions
are generally unlikely.'" Accounting for all of these differences, correlation risk
can be more effectively managed in life settlement securitization than in the
MBS context.
The broader economy affects life settlements less than mortgages,"oo but life
settlements' non-correlative nature can be exaggerated. Mortality has little to do
with economic cycles,20 ' but insurance death benefits are collected only if insur-
ers pay them. Insurers have a strong record of paying death benefits,2 0 2 but as
S&P notes, how investor-owned policies will fare in future insurer insolvencies
remains unknown. Conceivably, a legislature or court could give priority to tra-
ditional beneficiaries.2 0 3
The potential conflict of interest resulting from CRAs' employment by se-
curitization arrangers is present in the life settlement securitization environ-
ment, though it may be weaker than in mortgage securitization. Currently, life
settlement securitizations are rare, and CRAs do not depend on them for signif-
icant business.o4 Accordingly, undue pressure to pander to arrangers by inflat-
ing credit ratings is low. In contrast, at the mortgage securitization bubble's
peak in 2006, Moody's reported that 44% of its revenue came from issuing rat-
ings on structured financial products, largely MBS.20 5
Lastly, CRAs' hesitance to downgrade prior ratings on MBS applies to secu-
ritizations of life settlements as well, though perhaps to a lesser degree. Since the
197. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
198. A.M. BEST Co., supra note 135, at 6, 14; Anderson, supra note 27.
199. The Future of Human Longevity: How Vital Are Markets and Innovation?: Hearing
before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 1o8th Cong. 108-92 (2003) (statement of J.W.
Vaupel, Director, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research).
200. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. See MEZZULLO, supra note 142.
203. Thomas, supra note 135; see also discussion of Friction 8, infra Section II.B, notes
206-21n and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
205. Coval, Jurek & Stafford, supra note 188, at 4.
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life settlement market is smaller than the mortgage market, CRAs may feel less
embarrassed to admit mistakes related to life settlements. This may also reduce
fears about the systemic impact of downgrades. Additionally, agencies may have
emerged from the MBS crisis predisposed to respond to deteriorating situations
with quicker downgrades.
B. Frictions Unique to Insurance Settlement Securitization
Three additional frictions, not applicable to mortgage securitization, may
substantially affect life settlement securitization: frictions between (8) investors
and insolvent insurers' other creditors; (9) the insured and third parties; and
(io) investors and insureds' survivors.
Friction 8: Investors and Insurers' Other Creditors. When mortgagors be-
come insolvent and cannot pay home mortgage payments, mortgagees typically
enjoy a clear right to repossess the home. Investors buy life settlement-backed
securities expecting that when their servicer files a death claim with an insurer,
the insurer will pay benefits into the SPV that owns the decedent's life insurance
policy. But what if the insurer is insolvent? Although subject to state require-
ments concerning capitalization and reserve maintenance,' insurers may in-
vest much of their wealth, and losing investments sometimes lead to insolven-
cies. States often restrict insurers to seemingly safe investments,2 o' such as
highly rated bonds. As a result, insurance firms purchased large numbers of
MBS before the Great Recession.20s Insurer insolvencies have remained rare, but
some insurers have collapsed, such as the giant AIG.209
This example reflects that insurer insolvencies occur most often during
times of economic crisis-when seemingly safe investments plummet in value.
State guaranty laws, which safeguard payments to policyholders, govern stan-
dard insurer insolvencies."' Investors may ultimately enjoy equal treatment in
insurer insolvencies, but in a severe economic crisis, a court, legislature, receiv-
er, or trustee could prioritize payments to struggling families over Wall Street
investors. Fear of this sort of subordination was one reason cited by S&P for ab-
206. See i GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d 2:27-2:29 (Steven Plitt et al.
eds., 2009).
207. See id. at 2:30.
208. Gorton, supra note 41 (manuscript at 43).
209. See PETER G. GALLANIS, NT'L ORG. LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUARANTY Assocs., THE
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE GUARANTY SYSTEM, AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF
20o8-2oo9, at ex.1A (2009), available at http://www.nolhga.com/resource/file/
NOLHGAandFinancialCrisis.pdf; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer's
Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al (discussing the
collapse of AIG).
210. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 631.71-737 (2010); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 175, § 146B (2009);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-1700-1721 (2010).
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staining from life settlement securitization rating altogether.2" The magnitude
of this risk to investors is unclear, but it does indicate that life settlement-
backed securities can be vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the broader economy,
as discussed vis-h-vis CRAs under Friction 7.
Friction 9: Investors and Insureds. Friction i explored the view that the ori-
ginate-to-distribute model of lending created moral hazard, encouraging lend-
ers to issue mortgages with a high likelihood of default, but mortgage origina-
tors certainly have no affirmative interest in causing a loan to fail. Mortgagors,
though they would rather not make payments, stand to lose dearly in default
and have no interest in destroying their property. Though different parties to a
mortgage oppose each other as debtor and creditor, all parties have aligned in-
terests in seeing loans repaid without foreclosure and with homes intact.
In a life settlement, insureds usually seek an outcome that destroys investor
value: not dying. Moreover, when an insured's life expectancy is extended
through treatment or otherwise, the insured need not inform investor, servicer,
or settlement provider. The servicer may periodically contact the insured to de-
termine whether the insured is alive,m' but Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) regulations allow insureds to revoke, at any time,
previous authorization for access to medical records. 13 Regulations generally
forbid medical professionals from sharing personal health information with an-
yone other than the patient without patient authorization. 14 A.M. Best advises
security-issuers to offer insureds incentives to continue providing health infor-
mation or seek limited powers of attorney so that up-to-date health informa-
tion will be available during the rating process; the rating agency warns, howev-
er, that enforcement of powers of attorney may not be practical, and continual
access to the insured's health information is unlikely."1 This will remain true
unless medical privacy laws change significantly.
Investors in MBS suffer a similar lack of information regarding the finan-
cial health of mortgagors, but to a lesser degree. Servicers receive warning about
potential defaults when mortgagors miss payments. Also, a mortgagor in dete-
riorating financial condition may contact the servicer to negotiate loan restruc-
turing. This contact provides data to the servicer, and hence to investors, about
the state of the mortgages and the health of the investment. By contrast, inves-
tors in life settlement-backed securities likely cannot obtain up-to-date health
information on insureds and, therefore, cannot know about changes in the ex-
pected value of their investment, which insureds have an interest-and some-
times an ability-to diminish.
211. See Thomas, supra note 135.
212. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § io(G) (Nat'l Assoc. of Ins. Comm'rs 2008).
213. 45 C.F.R. § 164-508(b)( 5 ) (2009).
214. See 45 C.F.R. § 164-502 (2009).
215. A.M. BEST Co., supra note 135, at 9.
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Friction io: Investors and Insured's Survivors. Investors in MBS do not ulti-
mately depend on the help of mortgage lenders to collect payments. However, if
a life insurer denies a death claim, investors in life settlement-backed securities
may require assistance from the insured's survivors. Insurers can deny claims
based on an assertion that the insured's death was not covered-or on allega-
tions of insurance fraud or lack of insurable interest. In all of these cases, inves-
tors may need evidence in the possession of the insured's grieving survivors,
who may be disinclined to help investors.
Investors may seek court orders to compel survivors to help, and if the in-
surer succeeds in denying the claim, investors may have a contract claim against
the insured's estate for selling an invalid policy. But such action would incur
litigation costs and possibly encounter statute of limitations issues. This fric-
tion-the separation of the survivors' information from the beneficial interest
in the policy-injects additional uncertainty into the value of a life settlement.
C. The Frictions' Net Effect
Fundamental differences between mortgage and life settlement securitiza-
tion make it difficult to determine which is more plagued by the various fric-
tions, but it is safe to say that enough informational asymmetries, ambiguities,
and divergent interests exist to cause serious problems in life settlement securi-
tization. The life settlement market's smaller size will mean its influence on the
broader economy is less than that of mortgage securitization. Recall that projec-
tions on life settlements stop short of predicting $200 billion in settled life in-
surance by 2030,"' though the market could expand more, given the $19.1 tril-
lion in life insurance policies in force at the end of 2008."I Still, a crisis that
costs billions of dollars is always significant, and there are several ways that
losses from a life settlement crisis could become greater than expected. For ex-
ample, a significant prevalence of STOLI-perhaps brought on by securitiza-
tion-spurred demand for settlements as discussed under Friction i-could
cause market growth beyond current projections and could cause a crisis in
which significant investment value is completely erased.
A life settlement crisis could also have stronger impact if, for example, ba-
by-boomers increasingly retire without sufficient savings. The life settlement
market could then grow more than expected in size and effect on the national
economy. The widespread misperception that life settlements are immune from
economic downturns could also lead to more investment than currently pro-
jected. Other exogenous events could also exacerbate the frictions and risks dis-
cussed above. Advances in medical technology could significantly prolong life
expectancies-perhaps across many diseases-and greatly reduce investment
payouts a la Frictions 7 (between investors and CRAs) and 9 (between investors
and insureds). A major recession, especially one that engenders popular anger
216. KAMATH & SLEDGE, supra note 36, at 8.
217. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, supra note 37, at 66.
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at Wall Street while also producing insurer insolvencies, could jeopardize inves-
tors' interests as discussed under Friction 8. Again, the greater fear must be that
after an initial loss of value, a collapse in life settlement securitization could me-
tastasize into a larger crisis if uncertainty gives way to panic.
Moreover, the collapse of life settlement securitization would almost surely
have the second-order effect of essentially eliminating demand for life insurance
policies in the secondary market. Thus, a crisis would affect investors as well as
elderly policyholders in need of settlements. They would suffer especially if, as
discussed above, their life expectancies-and, therefore, their need for retire-
ment funds-were significantly increased. This would force elderly policyhold-
ers to cope in other ways: working later in life, borrowing or receiving money
from their families, or selling other assets such as real estate and financial hold-
ings. This is a disaster worth preventing.
III. PROPOSED REGULATION
How can law serve to resolve frictions in life settlement securitization and
reduce associated risks? Congress recently passed, and President Obama signed
into law, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to
overhaul U.S. financial regulation and impose new rules for securitization." As
noted earlier, Steven Strongin of Goldman Sachs has argued that life settlement
securitization poses no unique risks and demands no special regulation, 9 so he
would likely urge Congress to go no further than the Dodd-Frank Act.
As explored in Part II, however, the securitization process for life settle-
ments exhibits frictions distinct from other securitizations and manifests now
familiar frictions in nuanced ways. While some provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act, as discussed below, help alleviate frictions and risks in life settlement secu-
ritization, we still need additional specialized regulation. This Note serves as a
warning that Congress's action to date on securitization regulation is too nar-
row. As the American Bar Association (ABA) Business Law Section asserts, "a
Ione size fits all' approach is unlikely to work for securitization, which is more
varied in its structures, assets and economics than most observers realize."22o
The failure of Congress to heed this advice may prove costly.
This Part discusses what regulations are appropriate for life settlement se-
curitization, given the likely interpretations of the Dodd-Frank Act. These regu-
lations-several already included in the Dodd-Frank Act and five newly pro-
posed here-divide fairly neatly into four categories. In order of importance to
218. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. Iu-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
219. Securitization Hearings, supra note 17, at 5 (statement of Steven H. Strongin, Man-
aging Director, Goldman, Sachs & Co.).
22o. ABA SECTION OF Bus. LAW, SECURITIZATION IN THE POsT-CRISIs EcONOmy 27
(2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslawlcommittees/CL1120oopub/ ma-
terials/20o0buslawabalettertocongressassetsecuritizationreportjan252oo.pdf
287
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
life settlement securitization, the categories are: (A) reforms targeting lender,
settlement provider, and securitizer incentives; (B) investor protection through
credit rating improvements; (C) direct protections for investors; and (D) front-
end consumer and insurer protections.
The five proposals introduced here aim to help safeguard the principles of
transparency and appropriate interest alignment. These principles are critical
because a healthy market in settlement-backed securities requires that all parties
be able to discern the risks they assume, and better-positioned actors have suffi-
ciently low incentive to take advantage of other market participants. Again in
order of importance, these five new proposals are: (i) risk retention require-
ments for settlement providers to reduce moral hazard; (2) specialized disclo-
sures by CRAs to clarify risks for investors; (3) a federal prohibition on prioriti-
zation of ordinary insurance beneficiaries over investors in insurer insolvencies;
(4) a federal STOLI ban; and (5) enhanced insurance applications to prevent
STOLL
A. Reforms Targeting Lender, Settlement Provider, and Securitizer Incentives
The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to readjust incentives of lenders and securitizers
to eliminate moral hazard and the temptation to create and sell bad debt. The
principal mechanism proposed for achieving this goal is the concept of risk re-
tention.2 2 ' If lenders or securitizers remain subject to a portion of the credit risk
associated with the self-liquidating assets they sell, they will work harder to en-
sure that those assets are likely to pay off.2 In theory, this sort of reform would
ameliorate Friction 1 by discouraging lending to borrowers who are not likely to
repay, and Frictions 2 and 3 by reducing lenders' and securitizers' ability to sell
bad debts without putting themselves in peril.
Those who deny that the divorce between risk and influential market actors
has played a role in the securitization crisis2 3 may continue to argue that risk
retention requirements are unnecessary. Others worry that risk retention may
actually increase the likelihood of problems by communicating to market par-
ticipants that a given risk is reasonable when in fact lenders and securitizers
have misjudged risky assets.2 4 The ABA's Business Law Section has expressed
(somewhat outlandish) concerns that risk retention requirements may have
other unintended consequences such as ending securitization altogether." The
moral hazard logic, however, appears clear: Asset originators and securitizers
are more likely to deal in faulty assets when they face no negative conse-
221. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 941(b).
222. See Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 132o.
223. See, e.g., id. at 1318-21.
224. Id. at 1320 n.35.
225. ABA SECTION OF Bus. LAW, supra note 220, at 26.
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quences;"' forcing originators to retain some of the risk they create would re-
solve this problem. Nevertheless, the Dodd-Frank Act calls for a study to assess
the likely effects of risk retention requirements and how best to manage them.22 7
The new law also calls for federal agencies to determine an appropriate por-
tion of risk for originators and securitizers to retain."' Importantly, "origina-
tor" is defined as "a person who... through the extension of credit or other-
wise, creates a financial asset that collateralizes an asset-backed security. . . .""9
The law's risk retention requirements will help alleviate Friction 3-the incen-
tive and ability of securitizers to exploit third parties in securitization of mort-
gages, life settlements, and many other asset types. In loan-based securitiza-
tions, regulators can also assign some risk to lenders, thereby helping to resolve
Friction 2, creating incentives for lenders to ensure the credit-worthiness of
borrowers. However, the language of the bills does not require risk retention by
settlement providers unless they also serve as securitizers. This is because set-
tlement providers buy but do not create a financial asset. As such, the likely in-
terpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act will not mitigate Friction 2 for life settle-
ment securitization.
Life Settlement-Specific Regulatory Proposal 2: Risk Retention by Settlement
Providers to Alleviate Frictions 2 and i0. Providers of viatical and life settlements
who are not also securitizers should be required to retain some investment risk
in their securitized policies. This reform is necessary for the same reason securi-
tizers should retain some risk: Aligning the interests of those with power to
represent an investment's value with the interests of the eventual investors.23 o
Note, however, that the new law calls for risk retention by lenders, who again,
correspond to insureds in life settlement transactions. However, requiring insu-
reds to retain risk would be inappropriate because financial incentives that take
effect after their deaths are unlikely to influence their behavior. Moreover, insu-
reds' interest in living longer is always at odds with investors' interests in col-
lecting benefits, as discussed under Friction 9 above.
Risk retention by settlement providers would, conversely, help resolve Fric-
tion 2 by incentivizing providers to conduct thorough diligence on insureds and
ensure that their settlements are good bets. The reform also aims to reduce Fric-
tion io between investors and insured's survivors by encouraging settlement
providers to gather as much potentially useful information as possible from the
insured so that, in any eventuating litigation, investors will depend as little as
possible on the insured's survivors for assistance.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 16o, 170, 177-179.
227. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. in-
203, § 946, 124 Stat. 1376 (2olo).
228. Id. § 9 4 1(b).
229. Id.
230. Others have made similar suggestions. See Securitization Hearings, supra note 17,
at 20 (statement of Daniel Curry, President, DBRS Inc.).
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B. Investor Protection Through Credit Rating Improvements
Credit ratings exist to inform investors of the magnitude of risk in their in-
vestments. To aid in that mission and to give investors a clearer understanding
about the reliability of ratings, the Dodd-Frank Act calls for regulation of CRAs
to improve their operations and increase transparency. The law calls for a sys-
tem of internal controls at each CRA to ensure the integrity of its ratings"' and
requires each agency's rating methodologies to be approved by its board?32 The
Act also calls on the SEC to set requirements for public disclosures concerning
every rating. The Act provides guidance to the SEC that these disclosures should
be easily comparable to the disclosures of other CRAs and should include in-
formation regarding data that has informed the rating; underlying assumptions;
limitations of the rating and risks that the agency has not examined; the agen-
cy's level of uncertainty in the rating; relevant conflicts of interest; historical
performance of the rating; and expected probability of default 33 While the Act
does not prohibit CRAs from being employed by the institutions whose is-
suances they rate, it does seek to minimize conflicts of interest by requiring
agencies to separate their sales and marketing functions from their rating activi-
ties?
These reforms promise to improve the rating process for all securitizations,
increasing the likelihood of accurate ratings and helping investors understand
the meaning of the ratings. However, under its new authority from Congress,
the SEC will presumably promulgate disclosure requirements with the recent
crisis in mind, and the new disclosure requirements will likely focus on the li-
mitations of rating mortgage securitizations. The SEC should ensure, though,
that its requirements do not focus too exclusively on those limitations, allowing
risks specific to life settlement and other securitizations to go unreported. The
SEC should issue tailored CRA disclosure requirements relating to the special
limitations on the ratings of life settlement-backed securities.
Life Settlement-Specific Regulatory Proposal 2: Special CRA Disclosures to Al-
leviate Frictions 7 and 9. To promote transparency and discourage over-reliance
on ratings (Friction 7), 1 propose three disclosures that CRAs should make to
investors relating to special attributes of life settlement securitizations. CRAs
should make these disclosures rather than securitizers because CRAs have less
financial incentive to downplay negative information and perhaps less bias to
prevent assessment of negative factors.
First, CRAs should provide investors with an estimate of life expectancy
correlation risks. While disease diversity can mitigate the overall effect of ad-
vances in medicine, some correlation risk will always remain. CRAs should fur-
231. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 932(a)(2)(B).
232. Id. § 932(a)(8).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 932(a)(4).
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ther explain that error in estimating correlation risk could seriously and ad-
versely affect rating accuracy. Second, as Congress envisions, CRAs should be
upfront about information that they cannot know. In the life settlement con-
text, this means that CRAs should explain that life expectancy determination is
not yet a statistically-reliable science, even when applied to large numbers.
CRAs should estimate the penetration of STOU and other fraud in a policy
pool but emphasize that no rating agency can be sure of exact figures.
Finally, CRAs should explain that changes in the prognoses of underlying
insureds could affect investment values. This information, moreover, may be
unavailable to anyone but the insureds themselves (Friction 9) due to medical
privacy laws. While this CRA disclosure would not eliminate the friction be-
tween investors and insureds, it would alert investors and reduce the likelihood
of market panic when investors do encounter Friction 9. Some may argue that
generally framed requirements could adequately solicit all of these disclosures,
but to ensure that CRAs do not again hide weaknesses in their ratings-
intentionally or not-disclosure requirements should be specific.
C. Direct Protections for Investors
The Dodd-Frank Act includes provisions to increase protections of and dis-
closures to potentially vulnerable investors. These reforms aim to resolve Fric-
tion 3 (between securitizers and third parties, including investors) by enabling
investors to investigate sellers more effectively. The reforms also attempt to mi-
tigate Friction 6 (between investors and asset managers) by encouraging asset
managers to maintain adequate care for clients' interests.
The Act requires disclosure to investors of the R&Ws that come with asset-
backed securities and, importantly, how given R&Ws differ from industry stan-
dards."' The hope here is to give investors enough information with which to
identify riskier securities that come without significant guarantees. The Act calls
for CRAs to make this disclosure,"' though some argue it should come directly
from issuers themselves.37 It also requires securitizers to disclose all the repur-
chase requests they have fulfilled-that is, every time an asset has been repur-
chased by its issuer because a representation or warranty to investors had been
violated.3' The intention here is to enable "investors [to] identify asset origina-
tors with clear underwriting deficiencies." 5 9 However, the ABA Business Law
Section argues that this information may not be as meaningful as the total
number of repurchase requests received.n'0
235. Id. § 943(1).
236. Id.
237. ABA SECTION OF Bus. LAW, supra note 220, at 35.
238. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 943(2).
239. Id.
240. ABA SECTION OF Bus. LAW, Supra note 220, at 36.
291
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
In the interest of increasing investment manager accountability to investors
(ameliorating Friction 6), the Dodd-Frank Act calls for a study to determine
whether to eliminate the distinction between broker-dealers and investment ad-
visors by imposing on the former fiduciary duties of care long associated with
the latter."' If Congress does make such a change, then whenever investors rely
on broker-dealers' advice in buying asset-backed securities, the broker-dealers
would be liable for any lapse in due care. However, this reform is of limited val-
ue: In typical securities transactions, unsophisticated investors (such as pen-
sioners) are already represented by investment advisors with fiduciary duties.42
Understanding R&Ws, knowing about repurchases resulting from R&W vi-
olations, and enjoying fiduciary guarantees of broker-dealer care would benefit
any securitization investor to some degree. However, these regulations do noth-
ing to address the special risk faced by investors in life settlement securitiza-
tions-that an investor-owned policy would be subordinated to policies with
ordinary beneficiaries in insurer insolvency (Friction 8). This risk deserves spe-
cial regulation.
Life Settlement-Specific Regulatory Proposal 3: Investor Protection in Insurer
Insolvency to Alleviate Friction 8. A federal mandate of equal treatment for the
two policy types could largely cure the risk of investor subordination to tradi-
tional beneficiaries. Again, that risk would be most acute in major recessions
characterized by popular anger at Wall Street and investors. And since parts of
the Dodd-Frank Act may make Washington bailouts of insurance companies
more likely, 43 this reform should also ensure that taxpayer bailout funds go to
insurer creditors regardless of their investor or non-investor status.
This reform would benefit investors by making investment values clearer,
and it is also fair. If investors have paid premiums like policy-holding insureds,
it is inequitable to deprive investors of their rightful return. Moreover, investors
will have already helped other insureds by paying them for their policies at sale.
All insureds benefit from the increased access to liquidity that these investors
provide. Federal law should protect all of these benefits-to insureds and inves-
tors-in insurer insolvencies.
The strongest argument against this reform is that it is unnecessary: Insur-
ers rarely become insolvent and always pay death claims.2" This reform admit-
tedly guards against a worst-case, but possible, scenario that seems most likely
in a major recession. As improbable as such a scenario may be, one of the most
important lessons of the late crisis must be that the apparent improbability of a
crisis is not a sufficient reason to forgo safeguarding against it.
241. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 913.
242. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
243. Jonathan Macey, Dodd Bill Too Opaque, POLITICo, Apr. 19, 2010, http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/o41o/36037.html.
244. See supra discussion at notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
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D. Front-End Consumer and Insurer Protections
Other provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act seek to prevent predatory lending
and related exploitation of consumers. These provisions aim to resolve Fric-
tion i (between lenders and borrowers), which threatens to lead to bad debts.
The Act creates, within the Federal Reserve System, a new Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (BCFP) to oversee and regulate institutions that provide
financial services or products to consumers.45
However, the BCFP's role in life settlement securitization is likely to be li-
mited. The law may be interpreted to prevent settlement providers from ex-
ploiting insureds, but this has become less common than fraud on life settle-
ment investors.246 The BCFP may alternatively protect investors, but life
settlement-backed CDO investors are likely to be large institutional investors
rather than consumers. Again, though, since insurers in life settlement securiti-
zation fill the role of consumer in mortgage securitization, the important "con-
sumer" protections become the provisions that encourage stable market opera-
tion by protecting insurers. The proposals below aim to prevent unnecessary
risks from falling on insurers and spreading to the rest of the insurance market
through, for example, higher premiums.
Life Settlement-Specific Regulatory Proposal 4: Federal STOLI Ban to Alleviate
Frictions i and 7. The Dodd-Frank Act contemplates substantial nationalization
of insurance regulation.'47 For the sake of clarity and transparency, the ultimate
package of federal insurance regulation should include a prohibition on STOLI,
as so many have advocated at the state level."8 A nationwide STOLI ban would
ease Friction i by simplifying the law that insurers and applicants must navigate
and by reducing ambiguity over whether states that have yet to adopt anti-
STOLI laws will respect STOLI contracts. The ban would further save insurers
from having to bear the extra costs STOLI creates.'49 The reduction in ambigui-
ty also serves to somewhat alleviate Friction 7 because CRAs can issue more re-
liable ratings when they are more certain of the effects of a potential defect in an
underlying asset. Some industry proponents would likely charge, as they have at
the state level,2 o that a federal STOLI ban, depending on its stringency, may go
too far and discourage legitimate life settlements. While regulators should be
sensitive to these concerns, preventing the systemic costs of STOLI should re-
main a regulatory imperative.
Life Settlement-Specific Regulatory Proposal 5: Insurance Application En-
hancement to Alleviate Friction 1. Insurance regulators should approve life insur-
245. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ iooi-uoo(h).
246. Doherty & Singer, supra note 30, at 477 n-76.
247. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 501-42.
248. See supra Sections LB-C.
249. See supra Section LB.
250. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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ance application forms that include clear warnings against STOLI and questions
to discover it. Those applicants who pay attention to the additions may aban-
don participation in STOLI schemes or reveal enough information so that in-
surers can appropriately deny applications. This reform would certainly not
prevent all STOLI or all fraud but would, in a small way, increase transparency
and clarity for applicants and insurers. It will help to reduce the prevalence of
STOLI and resolve Friction i, to the benefit of insurers and investors alike.
CONCLUSION
Life settlement securitization bears many of the risks and frictions identi-
fied as causes of the current financial crisis-as well as potentially dangerous
frictions not seen in other types of securitization. A breakdown in this market
would destroy significant investment value and could create a sizable disaster
for the broader economy. A recently enacted law promises to alleviate some of
the latent dangers in life settlement securitization, but this Note has shown that
likely interpretations of that law will not adequately address the many species of
securitization beyond those that sparked the Great Recession. Regulation must
go further and address the nuanced risks of markets like the life settlement
trade. Congress and President Obama are rightly focusing their economic re-
forms on issues that have caused the latest crisis, but government should not
limit itself to fighting the last war. Neither should it blindly impose one-size-
fits-all reforms. Life settlement securitization exhibits risks that threaten all par-
ties involved and, to a degree, the larger economy. This is a market that deserves
sensible regulation to clarify risk and minimize bad incentives.
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